A Appendix

A.1 Background on Anti-Dumping Investigations

Petitions are filed simultaneously with the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Once a petition is filed, the Department of Commerce decides whether to initiate an investigation. This decision is affirmative as long as the petition contains the requisite information. An affirmative decision results in a preliminary investigation by the ITC.

This preliminary investigation assesses whether there is any indication that U.S. firms are injured or threatened to be injured by the imported goods under investigation. In this preliminary phase, the ITC reviews documents, involves witness hearings, and requests written information from petitioning firms, other domestic firms, and the firms alleged to engage in dumping. It concludes with a vote by the Commissioners. As long as there is any reasonably indication of potential injury or a potential threat of injury to U.S. firms, this preliminary determination is affirmative; tied votes among the six Commissioners are considered affirmative.

Once the Department of Commerce likewise reaches an affirmative decision about whether products are likely sold below fair market value, importing firms have to start posting cash deposits or bonds in the amount of estimated anti-dumping duties. The decision by the Department of Commerce requires a fairly low evidentiary burden. It is sufficient if the Secretary of Commerce (or the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance as delegate) determines to have "a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that the subject imported merchandise is being sold or is likely to be sold" below fair market values (U.S. International Trade Commission, 2015, II-13).

The investigation process then turns to the final investigation phase. As in the preliminary phase, the Department of Commerce seeks to establish whether products are likely to be sold below fair market value, while the ITC seeks to establish whether U.S. firms are materially injured or threatened with material injury. The process is similar to the preliminary investigation, but allows for more time and is more rigorous. In particular, it includes formal hearings and also allows for the submission of written briefs by other parties. Notably, all parties testifying at these hearings are sworn in by the Secretary to the ITC, implying penalties for false and misleading statements in these hearings. The final investigation ends again in a vote by the Commissioners of the ITC. If this vote is affirmative and the Department of Commerce determines that products are likely sold below market value, the Department of Commerce issues an anti-dumping order, imposing duties on the imported products are investigation.

A.2 Withdrawn Cases: Permuting the Outcome Variable

A small proportion of anti-dumping petitions were terminated or withdrawn without final or negative preliminary ruling. Unfortunately, these cases are difficult to allocate as either wins or losses. On the one hand, a withdrawn case may indicate that the petitioner lost faith in a positive outcome, deciding to no longer spend (political and financial) capital on a petition. On the other hand, Prusa (1992) shows that withdrawn cases frequently are the result of private bargaining between a petitioner and the foreign counterpart, resulting in a settlement that often benefits the petitioner.

In the main models in the text, we omit these cases from the data set. Here, we consider an alterna-

tive approach. Instead of enumerating all possible distributions of wins and losses across terminated and withdrawn cases, we consider random permutations. We proceed in four steps. First, we determine a fixed probability p of a case being a win for the petitioner, ranging from 0.05 to .95, in steps of .05. We will consider the probability of wins and losses as synonymously with the proportion of wins and losses: at the lower end of the scale, most cases are considered losses, and the upper end, most cases are considered wins for the petitioner. Second, at each of these steps, we randomly allocate wins and losses across terminated and withdrawn cases, according to this fixed probability. For example, for $p = .05$, each terminated or withdrawn case is coded as a win with a probability of 5%, and as a loss with a probability of 95%. Third, we repeat step 2 $5,000$ times, to obtain $5,000$ permutations of wins and losses across terminated and withdrawn cases, for each fixed probability of wins and losses. Fourth, we estimate our baseline model with an outcome variable that incorporates these imputed wins and losses, which results in $5,000$ coefficient estimates of η at each probability of wins and losses.

None of these estimates are statistically significantly different from the original coefficient estimate. Additionally, we report two sets of results. Figure A1 reports the range of coefficient estimates and the proportion of statistically insignificant coefficient estimates at the 5% level. The horizontal axis reports the proportion of terminated and withdrawn cases that we considered wins, and each bar represent the upper and lower end of the distribution of $5,000$ estimates. The dashed horizontal line represents the original coefficient estimate. Figure A2 reports, similarly, the t-statistics and again the proportion of statistically insignificant coefficient estimates at the 5% level. As before, the horizontal axis reports the proportion of unobserved cases that we considered wins, and each bar represent the upper and lower ends of the distribution of $5,000$ estimates. The dashed horizontal line represents the critical value for the t-statistic for a test at the 5% significance level.

As Figures A1 and A2 demonstrate, our results are robust to making any assumptions about lost and won cases. In total, each Figure represents the results from $95,000$ estimations: $5,000$ estimates for each bar, at 19 values for the proportion of cases we consider wins. Among the unobserved (terminated or withdrawn) petition outcomes, private bargaining would result in our coefficient estimates losing statistical significance in none of the scenarios we considered. Moreover, the coefficient estimate remains stable across permutations and within a relatively narrow range around the original estimate.



Figure A1 Range of coefficient estimates (capped bars, in blue, left axis) and proportion of statistically insignificant coefficient estimates at the 5% level (circles, in orange, right axis), at different levels of the proportion of petitioner wins among unobserved outcomes (horizontal axis), across $5,000$ permutations of wins and losses at each level.



Figure A2 Range of t-statistics (capped bars, in blue, left axis) and proportion of statistically insignificant coefficient estimates at the 5% level (circles, in orange, right axis), at different levels of the proportion of petitioner wins among unobserved outcomes (horizontal axis), across $5,000$ permutations of wins and losses at each level.

B Additional Results

In Table G1, in the first two columns we report results when using η derived from the input-output tables in a single year, 2012. This ensures that differences in η are only driven by cross-industry differences, not by differences in industry aggregations and disaggregations over time.

In the third and fourth column, we report results when distinguishing between related-party trade and arms-length transactions. A substantial portion of U.S. imports constitutes related-party trade: imports that are sourced from U.S.-owned firms abroad. Our measure η^M stripped these out, as part of overall import volumes. We construct an alternative measure that retains related-party imports and only strips out arms-length imports. To do so, we obtain data on related-party trade by industry from the Census Bureau's annual reports.[21] These data provide us with a measure of the share of imports that are sourced from U.S.-owned firms abroad and the share of imports that are sourced from foreign firms through arms-length transactions. We then re-construct our measure, resulting in a variable η^F, which only adjusts for imports sourced through arms-length transactions.

In columns 5 and 6, we provide results for using (logged) total domestic inputs sourced by an industry. This presents an alternative – and simpler – measure of importance to upstream industries. Unlike our main measures, this variable does not take into account the distribution across industries or the importance to upstream industries relative to their size. It does, however, reflect a transparent metric to what extent production of a good draws on domestic suppliers, and it incorporates that sourcing a large amount of inputs might be economically and politically meaningful, even if it only accounts for a small portion of an upstream supplier's output. We leave a more complete exploration of the role of industry size of customers relative to suppliers to future work.

In Table G2-G4, we consider standard errors clustered by (1) firms, by (2) industries, and by (3) petitions and industries simultaneously. In Table G5, we estimate weighted logistic regression models, with weights corresponding to the number of observations belonging to each petition. In Table G6, we collapse the data by the petition, averaging observations across products and firms using firm employment shares as weights; in Table G7, we similarly collapse the data by the petition, but use simple averages instead. In Table G8, we include year fixed effects instead of a year polynomial. In Table G9, we estimate linear probability models.

We consider additional control variables in Tables G10-G17. For all of these, we replicate the extended baseline model with industry fixed effects, adding control variables. In Table G10, we include in odd columns a control variable for imports of an industry's inputs, to account for total foreign sourcing of an industry. Including this variable isolates differences in the extent of the domestic production network in our main variable of interest. Put differently, this variable allows us to hold constant total foreign sourcing, thus focusing on differences in the domestic production network and the distribution of sourcing across industries, as reflected in η, η^M, and η^T. In even columns, we include the upstreamness measure from Antràs et al. (2012), which identifies the vertical position of a product in the production network. Including this variable distinguishes our results from an argument that downstream industries might receive more trade protection in a variant of tariff escalation.

[21] For 2000 to 2005, we obtain the data from the pdf reports. For years after 2005, we can use the data files provided by the Census Bureau. For 1998 and 1999, where the data are not available, we use information from 2000, given that related-party trade varies little year-to-year.

In Table G11, in odd columns we include a measure of vertical integration derived from the Orbis firm-level data. To obtain this measure, we use the data from the input-output tables to identify, for each NAICS six-digit industry, the NAICS six-digit industries that account for at least 1% of an industry's inputs. We obtain these data from the 2012 input-output tables to hold constant industry classifications. We then match these with the Orbis ownership data to identify, for each firm, whether at any point in time between 2007 and 2019 (the range of the Orbis data) it held a direct or indirect ownership stake in a firm from a supplying industry. We then calculate for each firm the sum of firms in supplying industries in which it holds such an ownership stake. In even columns, we include a measure of whether a firm has a subsidiary in the counter-party of the anti-dumping investigation. We first identified for each anti-dumping petition the target market against which the petition was filed. We then identified, for each firm in our data set that we were able to match with the Orbis data base, whether that firm had a subsidiary in the target market or whether a parent in the petitioner's corporate family had a subsidiary in the target market. The results for our main measures remain statistically significant at the 5% level in all models. Vertically integrated firms are more likely to have their anti-dumping petitions approved, consistent with the notion that these firms are likely to solve collective action problems within the boundaries of the firm.

In Table G12, in odd columns we include log Employees, obtained from the Orbis data base and from Refinitiv; where both data sources report the number of employees, we take the larger of the two values, because the Orbis data in some cases reports an implausibly small number of employees (e.g., fewer than 10 employees when the Refinitiv data reports over 700 employees). Including this variable cuts down our number of observations considerably, and likely biases our sample toward larger firms which report these data. In even columns, we therefore include log Employees at the industry-level. The results remain statistically significant at the 5% level in all models.

In Table G13, we include several industry-level control variables: In odd columns, we add an industry's contribution to GDP growth; in even columns, we include industry value added as a share of GDP and the capital-labor ratio, following Broz and Werfel (2014), obtained from the BEA. The coefficients on our core measures remain positive and statistically significant.

In Table G14, we include two control variables for political attributes. In odd columns, we include the (logged) number of counties in which an industry has at least 250 employees, following the cut-off used by Hansen (1990). In even columns, we include the share of counties with at least 250 employees in an industry that are represented by a Democratic member in the House of Representatives, which over most of the sample period were perceived as more protectionist on average than Republicans. We obtain data on industry employment across counties from the County Business Patterns, compiled and standardized by Eckert et al. (2020).

In Table G15, we examine the role of swing states. We define swing states as those that were won by a vote margin of five percent or less in the past Presidential election. In odd columns, we include total (log-transformed) employment in swing states by an industry involved in an anti-dumping petitition (we obtain similar results when using a dummy variable for whether an industry employed at least 250 employees in swing states). In even columns, we identify whether a petitioner is located in a swing state using information from the Global Anti-Dumping Database, company directories (include Orbis and Dun&Bradstreet), and information from anti-dumping petitions and press releases.

In Table G16, we control for a firm's political involvement, which might be a substitute or a com-

plement to the structural attribute we identify. We match the company names with data on campaign contributions from DIME (Bonica, 2024) and lobbying data from LobbyView (Kim, 2017). For 1998, where LobbyView provides no data yet, we manually supplement the LobbyView data with lobbying data from opensecrets.org, which – like LobbyView – draws on the Lobbying Disclosure Act reports. We include whether a firm provided campaign contributions or lobbied in the two years before or after an anti-dumping investigation in odd columns, and measures of whether a firm provided campaign contributions or lobbied at any given point during the sample period in even columns.

In Table G17, we include import volumes in odd columns as an alternative measure of import penetration. In even columns, we include exporting market fixed effects. These capture all time-invariant differences across countries that are the target markets of anti-dumping investigations – including, for example, political relations with the U.S. (beyond what is captured by the variable for non-market economies).

In Table G18, we split the sample, reporting results for market economies in odd columns and for non-market economies in even columns. We derive the variable of whether a country is classified as a non-market economy from the U.S. Federal Register. The results indicate that the results are confined to market economies. In cases directed against non-market economies, the effect disappears. This is consistent with an interpretation that domestic politics plays less of a role in cases against non-market economies.

In Table G19, we report results from negative binomial regression models with the total number of signatories of submissions by Members of Congress as the dependent variable.

C Case Merits

The empirical specifications included several predictors of whether dumping did, in fact, occur: most notably, import shocks and the real exchange rate. In particular, we sought to rule out that cases with higher values of our key measures are also cases with stronger merits, which would explain the reported association due to omitted variable bias.

Here, we present additional evidence based on disputes at the World Trade Organization. The concern above suggests that our key measures should be negatively correlated with being challenged: If case merit as an omitted variable explain the results, then cases on products important to upstream suppliers must have higher merits on average, and therefore should be less likely to be challenged at the WTO.

To evaluate whether this concern might explain our results, we first identify all anti-dumping petitions in our data set that were challenged at the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. We draw on Schott and Jung (2019), as well as the one-page summaries of disputes provided by the WTO, to create two variables: whether the U.S. decision was challenged at the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body; and whether this challenge was successful.[22]

We can only observe challenges at the WTO where the U.S. imposed anti-dumping duties. This, then, suggests an additional sample selection step, and we interpret the following results tentatively. Of

[22]We consider a challenge successful when the panel ruled in favor of the complainant or, if the decision was appealed, when the appellate body ruled in favor of the complainant. We consider partial decisions, split cases, and settled cases in favor of the complainant, because they indicate that at least part of the U.S. decision lacked legal merit.

cases for which the U.S. imposed anti-dumping duties in our data set, just under 20% were challenged at the WTO; the complaining party won at least a partial ruling in favor in 95% of those cases. In the top half of Table C1, we report the mean of η, η^T, and η^M for cases that were challenged at the WTO and for all other cases in which the U.S. imposed anti-dumping duties, together with the difference in means; in the bottom half we report the same for cases that were challenged at the WTO successfully. All numbers are conditional on export market fixed effects and industry size. As the table shows, both cases that were challenged at the WTO and cases that were challenged at the WTO successfully have considerably *higher* values of our key measures, between 14% and 25%; the difference is statistically signifciant at the 10% level in all cases. Petitions with higher values of our key measures thus appear to have higher approval rates not based on rules and legal merits, but for other – arguably, political – reasons.

Table C1 Legal Merits: WTO Disputes

Challenged at the WTO				
	challenged	unchallenged	difference	% difference
η	1.50	1.20	.298	25%
	(1.22)	(.062)	(1.40)	
η^T	4.56	3.90	.660	17%
	(.304)	(.154)	(.351)	
η^M	.531	.463	.068	15%
	(.029)	(.015)	(.034)	
Challenged successfully at the WTO				
	challenged	unchallenged	difference	% difference
η	1.50	1.21	.288	24%
	(.127)	(.062)	(.145)	
η^T	4.55	3.91	.642	16%
	(.317)	(.153)	(.364)	
η^M	.529	.464	.065	14%
	(.030)	(.014)	(.035)	

Mean of η, η^T, and η^M for cases challenged at the WTO and those not challenged; and for cases challenged at the WTO successfully and those unsuccessfully challenged or not challenged. Only cases on which the U.S. imposed anti-dumping duties considered. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All values conditional on industry size and export market fixed effects.

D Mediation Analyses

Production networks extend the effects of protectionism to suppliers upstream. We suggested one specific mechanism through which this becomes politically relevant: the indirect effects extend to swing states, which are politically relevant to the President. The President's interests, in turn, tend to be reflected in anti-dumping investigations (Bown et al., 2024).

This offers us an opportunity to evaluate this specific mechanism: whether the effects of anti-dumping duties extend into swing states is on the causal pathway from our measures to the outcome. Accordingly, we turn to mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon et al., 2007). First, we show that our measures do indeed correlate with the indirect exposure of swing states. To evaluate this, as before, we define swing states as those that were won with a vote margin of five percent or less in the previous Presidential election. We then calculate the weighted employment of an industry's suppliers in swing states, combining the shares of industry output absorbed by an industry as weights with data on employment by industry from the County Business Patterns provided by Eckert et al. (2020). With $\sigma_{i,j}$ as the share of output of industry j absorbed by industry i, $r_{j,s}$ as employment of industry j in state s, and $I(s)$ as an indicator equal to 1 if state s is a swing state, we thus calculate for each industry i total indirect employment in swing states as $\rho_i = \sum_s I(s) \sum_j \sigma_{i,j} r_{j,s}$.

In Table D2 we present results from linear regression models with (log) indirect employment in swing states as the outcome variable, retaining the same models as before for simplicity. Note that it is *plausible* that industries with larger upstream spillovers are correlated with higher indirect employment in swing states, but this is not true by construction. In particular, our measure is not directly related to the size of upstream industries, and it is not a given that the indirectly exposed employment is located in meaningful numbers in swing states. Nonetheless, as the results indicate, in our data set our measures of upstream spillovers are correlated with increased indirect employment in swing states.

To evaluate whether this indirect employment in swing states is part of the causal mechanism, we follow MacKinnon et al. (2007), who outline mediation analyses for binary outcome variables, as in our case. Our model specifications remain the same as usual, with the full set of control variables. In the top panel of Table D1, we first report the total effect of our respective measures; we then report the direct effects – which are not explained by the pathway through indirect employment in swing states – as well as the proportion of the effect that is mediated by indirect employment in swing states. Depending on the model specification, between 25% and 35% of the effects we reported are accounted for by the indirect exposure of swing states. In contrast, we find no evidence that our mechanism is mediated by direct employment in swing states, as shown in the last column of the table.

Table D1 Mediation Analysis

			proportion mediated by:	
	total effect	direct effect	indirect employment	direct employment
η	.485	.315	35%	3.5%
η^T	.232	.164	29%	1.7%
η^M	2.30	1.57	32%	1.5%

Table D2 Production Networks and Indirect Exposure of Swing States

DV: Indirect Employment Swing States (log)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
η	.60			
	(.000)			
η^T		.28		
		(.000)		
η^M			3.34	
			(.000)	
MNC	.33	.32	.34	
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	
Stock-listed	-.22	-.20	-.12	
	(.002)	(.002)	(.075)	
Real Exchange Rate	1.22	1.26	1.29	
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	
Fixed Assets	-.29	-.29	-.23	
	(.000)	(.000)	(.003)	
Steel Products	.25	.14	-.38	
	(.288)	(.531)	(.010)	
Industry Output (log)	.73	.68	.21	
	(.000)	(.000)	(.026)	
Percentage Change Imports	.34	.41	-.0011	
	(.066)	(.021)	(.994)	
Non-Market Economy	-.062	-.048	-.015	
	(.526)	(.614)	(.862)	
Campaign Contributions	.0082	.029	.16	
	(.863)	(.535)	(.001)	
Presidential Election	.39	.40	.39	
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	
Constant	-.70	-.59	5.25	
	(.665)	(.703)	(.001)	
Number Obs.	3,592	3,592	3,592	
Time trend	✓	✓		✓
NAICS 3-digit FE ✓	✓	✓		

Columns 1-3: Linear models with robust standard errors, clustered on petition. p-values in parentheses.

E Sensitivity Analyses

We cannot enumerate all possible sources of selection bias, just like we cannot enumerate all possible sources of confounding more generally. As suggested by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), we turn to a benchmarking approach: Given that both import shocks and real exchange rate misalignments are clear predictors of the initiation and the success rate of anti-dumping petitions (Broz and Werfel, 2014), we can assess how much stronger than these variables an omitted variable would have to be as a predictor of petition success to invalidate our results.

We present the results, based on our base models that we reported throughout the paper, in Table E1 for import shocks and in Table E2 for the real exchange rate. The tables indicate in the first column the maximum considered strength of the unobserved confounder as a predictor of the outcome, relative to the benchmark variable (import shocks and the real exchange rate); in the second column the resulting lower bound on the coefficient estimate of our key measure (η, η^T, and η^M, respectively); and the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient estimate in the last column. Note that these are linear models, and the coefficient estimates should therefore be compared to the linear probability model estimates reported above. The results indicate that even an unobserved confounder that is a ten times stronger predictor of petition success than import shocks, and that has the same correlation with import shocks as our key measures, would be insufficient to invalidate our results. We obtain similar results for other predictors from our base models, such as status as a non-market economy and whether the petition was filed in a Presidential election year.

Table E1 Sensitivity Analysis: Import Shocks as Benchmark

η		
multiple	coef.	95% CI
1	.053	(.034, .072)
5	.034	(.017, .052)
10	.019	(.004, .036)
η^T		
multiple	coef.	95% CI
1	.026	(.018, .033)
5	.019	(.012, .026)
10	.014	(.007, .020)
η^M		
multiple	coef.	95% CI
1	.376	(.303, .449)
5	.371	(.301, .440)
10	.367	(.302, .432)

Sensitivity analysis with benchmarking relative to import shocks: unobserved confounder with same correlation with η and 1x, 5x, and 10x stronger predictor of the success rate of anti-dumping petitions compared to import shocks. Table shows coefficients on η and 95% confidence intervals. Model specification follows the base model as described in the main text.

Table E2 Sensitivity Analysis: Real exchange rate as Benchmark

η		
multiple	coef.	95% CI
1	.068	(.050, .088)
5	.064	(.045, .083)
10	.061	(.042, .079)
η^T		
multiple	coef.	95% CI
1	.031	(.024, .039)
5	.029	(.022, .037)
10	.028	(.020, .035)
η^M		
multiple	coef.	95% CI
1	.380	(.304, .455)
5	.357	(.282, .432)
10	.340	(.266, .414)

Sensitivity analysis with benchmarking relative to real exchange rate: unobserved confounder with same correlation with η and 1x, 5x, and 10x stronger predictor of the success rate of anti-dumping petitions compared to real exchange rate. Table shows coefficients on η and 95% confidence intervals. Model specification follows the base model as described in the main text.

F Imports across Industries: Construction

To account for imports of inputs and changes in those patterns over time, we combine data from the input-output tables with product-level data on U.S. imports. To hold constant changes in production technology and industry classifications, we use data from the 2012 version of the input-output tables. This ensures that the driver of differences over time in our measure are changes in trade flows. We then concord these data to BEA I-O codes and match them with the 2012 Use Table to adjust for imported inputs.

We match U.S. product-level trade data from 1996 to 2020 to NAICS codes, using the concordance from Schott (2008), to obtain imports at the level of NAICS six-digit industries. We deflate imports, to account for price changes, by scaling them to the 2012 benchmark year.

Because no publicly available data track the usage of imports of specific commodities across industries, we follow BEA guidelines and allocate imports across industries based on a proportionality assumption: an industry's reliance on imports of a commodity is proportional to the ratio of total imports to domestic supply of that commodity. While it is unlikely that the proportionality assumption holds exactly, Feenstra and Jensen (2012) demonstrate that it is a good approximation: the correlation coefficient with a similarly constructed measure based on confidential transaction-level data is between .68 and .87, and most deviations fall within a relatively narrow band.

The proportionality assumption has an attractive implication for our research design: changes over time in imports, and therefore in our measure, are based on (1) changes in industry size, which we control for in our empirical models; and (2) changes in *total* imports of that commodity, which are not specific to the industry in question.[23]

We then concord these data to BEA I-O codes and match them with the 2012 Use Table to adjust for imported inputs. With $m^*_{i,j}$ denoting industry i's purchases of imported inputs j, we calculate analogously to above

$$\sigma^*_{i,j} = \frac{m_{i,j} - m^*_{i,j}}{q_j} = \sigma_{i,j} - \frac{m^*_{i,j}}{q_j}, \tag{6}$$

resulting in our third measure as

$$\eta^M_i = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sigma^*_{i,j}. \tag{7}$$

[23]The import matrices published by the BEA use the same proportionality assumption. See, for example, `https://www.bea.gov/help/faq/453`, last accessed March 14, 2024, where the BEA notes that "[because] source data are not available that show the imported share of intermediate inputs by industry, the estimates must be imputed" using a proportionality assumption.

G Imports across Industries: Sensitivity

In calculating η^M, we followed guidance from the BEA in allocating imports across industries uing a proportionality assumption. To assess whether the resulting measurement error could result in substantial bias, we lean on Feenstra and Jensen (2012), who compare the import allocation derived from the proportionality assumption to an import allocation derived from confidential, transaction-level data and find that (i) on average, the two measures are highly correlated, (ii) deviations are centered around zero, and (iii) deviations fall within a relatively narrow range, of about a quarter of a percentage point. In the following, we discuss the proportionality assumption, and we show that the results remain robust when allowing for arbitrary random perturbations of the industry share of imports.

The construction of η^M requires us to allocate imports of commodities across industries. To do so, we follow the BEA's proportionality assumption, such that an industry's use of a commodity as a share of total usage of that commodity corresponds to imports of that commodity as a share of total supply of that commodity. This assumption is unlikely to hold *exactly*, even though it is a reasonable approximation and corresponds to common practices. For example, the BEA provides import matrices as part of its input-output tables, and these import tables are based on the same proportionality assumption.

Feenstra and Jensen (2012) use confidential transaction-level data to evaluate the plausibility of this proportionality assumption. They report a correlation ranging from .68 to .87 when comparing a measure constructed from transaction-level data to a measure constructed using the proportionality assumption. Additionally, they report a histogram, showing that deviations are centered on zero, and that at the level of NAICS three-digit industries, almost all deviations fall within a range of 25 percentage points – with the vast majority being smaller than 10 percentage points.

To evaluate the robustness of our results to violations of the proportionality assumption, we create random perturbations of our import shares. To do so, we draw a random variable from a uniform distribution, with bounds $-t$ and t. We then add these perturbations to the import shares derived from the proportionality assumption, and allocate these perturbations across NAICS six-digit industries within each NAICS three-digit industry. We consider, in steps of $.025$, bounds for the uniform distribution between $t = .025$ and $t = .975$, exceeding significantly the range reported in Feenstra and Jensen (2012): at the upper end of the scenarios we consider, the *median* deviation is allowed to be as large as 50 percentage points. At each of the steps between $.025$ and $.975$, we create $1,000$ data sets based on perturbed import shares, calculate accordingly $1,000$ perturbed versions of η^M, estimate our baseline model $1,000$ times, and save the coefficient estimates and t-statistics for η^M.

Figure G1 reports the range of coefficient estimates and t-statistics, across the deviations we consider (on the horizontal axis, which depicts the parameter t ranging from .025 to .975), for each of the $1,000$ variants of η^M at each step – the Figure thus represents data from $39,000$ estimations. The estimates remain similar in size and statistically significant in every single case, corroborating that our results are robust to deviations from the proportionality assumption.



Figure G1 Range of coefficient estimates (capped bars, in blue, left axis) and t-statistics (capped bars, in red, right axis), when perturbing import shares with errors drawn from a uniform distribution of varying bounds (horizontal axis), across $1,000$ perturbations at each level of perturbations.

Table G1 Success of AD Petitions: Alternative Predictors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η^{2012}	.96	1.12				
	(.001)	(.000)				
η^{F}			1.36	1.65		
			(.004)	(.001)		
total domestic Inputs (log)					.57	.67
					(.002)	(.001)
Steel Products	-1.19	-1.45	-1.04	-1.40	-.50	-.92
	(.005)	(.043)	(.009)	(.050)	(.099)	(.170)
Industry Output (log)	-.14	.0051	-.14	-.00061	-.39	-.17
	(.388)	(.982)	(.398)	(.998)	(.076)	(.506)
Percentage Change Imports	1.74	2.77	1.63	2.63	1.83	2.85
	(.043)	(.000)	(.047)	(.000)	(.025)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.51	.83	.51	.84	.57	.87
	(.144)	(.018)	(.142)	(.017)	(.104)	(.013)
Campaign Contributions	-.42	-.41	-.40	-.40	-.43	-.41
	(.006)	(.001)	(.008)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)
Presidential Election	2.23	2.61	2.22	2.60	2.26	2.59
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
MNC		-.31		-.31		-.32
		(.050)		(.054)		(.043)
Stock-listed		-.071		-.063		-.074
		(.728)		(.754)		(.708)
Real Exchange Rate		1.89		2.03		1.85
		(.003)		(.002)		(.004)
Fixed Assets		-.016		-.0091		-.032
		(.894)		(.938)		(.782)
Constant	9.68	6.30	8.96	5.02	7.29	2.57
	(.002)	(.087)	(.004)	(.166)	(.006)	(.421)
Number Obs.	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Columns 1-6: Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered on petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G2 Success of AD Petitions: Clustered by Firm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.43	.48				
	(.002)	(.001)				
η^T			.19	.23		
			(.000)	(.000)		
η^M					2.17	2.30
					(.000)	(.000)
Steel Products	-.93	-1.36	-1.08	-1.32	-1.30	-1.49
	(.005)	(.033)	(.002)	(.029)	(.000)	(.025)
Industry Output (log)	.027	.30	.012	.23	-.28	-.11
	(.833)	(.068)	(.927)	(.160)	(.077)	(.580)
Percentage Change Imports	1.91	2.95	1.96	3.12	1.69	2.68
	(.003)	(.000)	(.003)	(.000)	(.006)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.50	.79	.50	.81	.50	.85
	(.007)	(.000)	(.007)	(.000)	(.006)	(.000)
Campaign Contributions	-.48	-.49	-.47	-.48	-.38	-.38
	(.057)	(.030)	(.065)	(.032)	(.136)	(.091)
Presidential Election	2.23	2.61	2.23	2.61	2.23	2.62
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
MNC		-.31		-.32		-.30
		(.245)		(.241)		(.257)
Stock-listed		-.11		-.11		-.040
		(.683)		(.701)		(.883)
Real Exchange Rate		2.10		2.19		2.07
		(.000)		(.000)		(.000)
Fixed Assets		-.036		-.036		-.0067
		(.848)		(.850)		(.972)
Constant	6.98	1.81	6.92	2.05	10.6	6.34
	(.004)	(.534)	(.004)	(.476)	(.000)	(.049)
Number Obs.	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by firm. p-values in parentheses.

Table G3 Success of AD Petitions: Clustered by Industry

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.43	.48				
	(.010)	(.032)				
η^T			.19	.23		
			(.002)	(.004)		
η^M					2.17	2.30
					(.000)	(.000)
Steel Products	-.93	-1.36	-1.08	-1.32	-1.30	-1.49
	(.016)	(.081)	(.005)	(.073)	(.000)	(.066)
Industry Output (log)	.027	.30	.012	.23	-.28	-.11
	(.872)	(.313)	(.943)	(.403)	(.160)	(.738)
Percentage Change Imports	1.91	2.95	1.96	3.12	1.69	2.68
	(.004)	(.000)	(.008)	(.000)	(.002)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.50	.79	.50	.81	.50	.85
	(.003)	(.000)	(.003)	(.000)	(.003)	(.000)
Campaign Contributions	-.48	-.49	-.47	-.48	-.38	-.38
	(.037)	(.001)	(.057)	(.004)	(.084)	(.016)
Presidential Election	2.23	2.61	2.23	2.61	2.23	2.62
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
MNC		-.31		-.32		-.30
		(.032)		(.029)		(.037)
Stock-listed		-.11		-.11		-.040
		(.696)		(.722)		(.885)
Real Exchange Rate		2.10		2.19		2.07
		(.005)		(.005)		(.003)
Fixed Assets		-.036		-.036		-.0067
		(.740)		(.741)		(.952)
Constant	6.98	1.81	6.92	2.05	10.6	6.34
	(.019)	(.585)	(.026)	(.550)	(.008)	(.162)
Number Obs.	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by industry. p-values in parentheses.

Table G4 Success of AD Petitions: Clustered by Petitions and Industries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.43	.48				
	(.028)	(.044)				
η^T			.19	.23		
			(.007)	(.006)		
η^M					2.17	2.30
					(.000)	(.000)
Steel Products	-.93	-1.36	-1.08	-1.32	-1.30	-1.49
	(.049)	(.083)	(.022)	(.075)	(.001)	(.065)
Industry Output (log)	.027	.30	.012	.23	-.28	-.11
	(.882)	(.324)	(.948)	(.415)	(.191)	(.743)
Percentage Change Imports	1.91	2.95	1.96	3.12	1.69	2.68
	(.051)	(.000)	(.057)	(.000)	(.050)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.50	.79	.50	.81	.50	.85
	(.111)	(.007)	(.112)	(.007)	(.112)	(.006)
Campaign Contributions	-.48	-.49	-.47	-.48	-.38	-.38
	(.057)	(.003)	(.079)	(.008)	(.122)	(.027)
Presidential Election	2.23	2.61	2.23	2.61	2.23	2.62
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)
MNC		-.31		-.32		-.30
		(.101)		(.099)		(.113)
Stock-listed		-.11		-.11		-.040
		(.732)		(.752)		(.899)
Real Exchange Rate		2.10		2.19		2.07
		(.009)		(.008)		(.005)
Fixed Assets		-.036		-.036		-.0067
		(.797)		(.798)		(.963)
Constant	6.98	1.81	6.92	2.05	10.6	6.34
	(.044)	(.603)	(.053)	(.567)	(.016)	(.177)
Number Obs.	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petitions and industries. p-values in parentheses.

Table G5 Success of AD Petitions: Weighted Logit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.57	.87				
	(.008)	(.003)				
η^T			.22	.36		
			(.004)	(.001)		
η^M					2.22	2.93
					(.000)	(.001)
Steel Products	-.56	-.29	-.61	-.33	-.80	-.72
	(.319)	(.768)	(.273)	(.707)	(.116)	(.479)
Industry Output (log)	-.062	.10	-.019	.13	-.20	-.094
	(.790)	(.724)	(.936)	(.626)	(.388)	(.768)
Percentage Change Imports	.48	3.61	.45	3.66	.35	3.30
	(.805)	(.007)	(.816)	(.006)	(.853)	(.015)
Non-Market Economy	.093	1.25	.11	1.32	.15	1.37
	(.893)	(.048)	(.874)	(.039)	(.829)	(.039)
Campaign Contributions	-.52	-.62	-.51	-.59	-.48	-.51
	(.115)	(.002)	(.127)	(.003)	(.161)	(.008)
Presidential Election	5.03	4.92	5.02	4.88	4.91	4.94
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
MNC		-.47		-.48		-.45
		(.269)		(.272)		(.303)
Stock-listed		-.093		-.072		-.013
		(.842)		(.874)		(.977)
Real Exchange Rate		1.79		1.93		1.83
		(.029)		(.020)		(.023)
Fixed Assets		-.11		-.10		-.074
		(.523)		(.548)		(.670)
Constant	9.91	6.88	9.63	6.33	12.6	10.5
	(.012)	(.139)	(.015)	(.173)	(.003)	(.047)
Number Obs.	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370	3,850	3,370
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses. Weighted by number of observations per petition.

Table G6 Success of AD Petitions: Collapse by Petition, Weighted Average

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.26	.31				
	(.074)	(.032)				
η^T			.11	.14		
			(.057)	(.020)		
η^M					1.05	1.36
					(.121)	(.040)
Steel Products	-.18	-.34	-.25	-.43	-.29	-.50
	(.630)	(.421)	(.530)	(.331)	(.521)	(.294)
Industry Output (log)	-.23	-.14	-.23	-.15	-.34	-.30
	(.189)	(.500)	(.173)	(.482)	(.118)	(.221)
Percentage Change Imports	1.37	1.53	1.37	1.54	1.15	1.27
	(.007)	(.004)	(.007)	(.003)	(.023)	(.017)
Non-Market Economy	.91	.91	.91	.92	.91	.91
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Campaign Contributions	-.19	-.11	-.19	-.088	-.16	-.043
	(.443)	(.712)	(.464)	(.761)	(.531)	(.879)
Presidential Election	1.18	1.19	1.19	1.20	1.22	1.24
	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)
MNC		-.47		-.50		-.48
		(.168)		(.145)		(.162)
Stock-listed		-.17		-.16		-.21
		(.588)		(.592)		(.493)
Real Exchange Rate		.76		.74		.74
		(.235)		(.249)		(.251)
Fixed Assets		.24		.23		.27
		(.262)		(.282)		(.220)
Constant	4.92	2.10	4.81	2.02	6.14	3.70
	(.043)	(.500)	(.045)	(.514)	(.029)	(.257)
Number Obs.	553	540	553	540	553	540
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G7 Success of AD Petitions: Collapse by Petition, Simple Average

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.30	.35				
	(.027)	(.014)				
η^T			.11	.13		
			(.062)	(.026)		
η^M					.96	1.40
					(.143)	(.026)
Steel Products	-.20	-.60	-.17	-.60	-.19	-.74
	(.561)	(.134)	(.653)	(.162)	(.668)	(.106)
Industry Output (log)	-.20	-.023	-.19	-.0086	-.27	-.17
	(.206)	(.909)	(.234)	(.965)	(.164)	(.456)
Percentage Change Imports	1.01	1.07	.94	1.01	.77	.79
	(.030)	(.030)	(.043)	(.041)	(.099)	(.113)
Non-Market Economy	.91	1.08	.92	1.09	.92	1.09
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Campaign Contributions	-.76	-.47	-.73	-.43	-.64	-.29
	(.018)	(.186)	(.023)	(.229)	(.043)	(.402)
Presidential Election	1.18	1.16	1.19	1.17	1.22	1.20
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
MNC		-.50		-.53		-.57
		(.186)		(.163)		(.119)
Stock-listed		-.0077		-.00063		.021
		(.984)		(.999)		(.957)
Real Exchange Rate		1.34		1.31		1.32
		(.032)		(.038)		(.035)
Fixed Assets		.25		.23		.27
		(.239)		(.272)		(.190)
Constant	4.29	.26	3.98	.056	5.02	1.74
	(.059)	(.927)	(.074)	(.984)	(.053)	(.563)
Number Obs.	630	574	630	574	630	574
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G8 Success of AD Petitions: Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.77	.74				
	(.000)	(.000)				
η^T			.33	.34		
			(.000)	(.000)		
η^M					3.41	3.17
					(.000)	(.000)
Steel Products	-1.57	-1.91	-1.75	-1.75	-2.05	-2.07
	(.001)	(.065)	(.000)	(.072)	(.000)	(.061)
Industry Output (log)	-.092	.28	-.087	.20	-.48	-.16
	(.622)	(.194)	(.607)	(.332)	(.025)	(.527)
Percentage Change Imports	2.23	3.61	2.17	3.60	1.86	3.19
	(.003)	(.000)	(.002)	(.000)	(.007)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.55	.72	.57	.75	.59	.77
	(.120)	(.047)	(.108)	(.036)	(.086)	(.033)
Campaign Contributions	-.29	-.35	-.27	-.33	-.24	-.31
	(.056)	(.008)	(.072)	(.012)	(.097)	(.015)
MNC		-.36		-.37		-.36
		(.031)		(.028)		(.031)
Stock-listed		.12		.13		.17
		(.567)		(.530)		(.403)
Real Exchange Rate		2.13		2.25		2.25
		(.006)		(.003)		(.002)
Fixed Assets		.11		.11		.14
		(.413)		(.426)		(.283)
Constant	537.2	649.4	514.2	632.0	483.2	624.1
	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)
Number Obs.	3,597	2,974	3,597	2,974	3,597	2,974
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses. Weighted by number of observations per petition.

Table G9 Success of AD Petitions: Linear Probability Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.069	.063				
	(.015)	(.036)				
η^T			.031	.032		
			(.003)	(.003)		
η^M					.38	.35
					(.000)	(.001)
Steel Products	-.17	-.22	-.20	-.24	-.26	-.29
	(.010)	(.026)	(.003)	(.014)	(.000)	(.007)
Industry Output (log)	.0088	.047	.0066	.039	-.041	-.0077
	(.667)	(.061)	(.739)	(.101)	(.074)	(.773)
Percentage Change Imports	.34	.44	.34	.45	.31	.41
	(.002)	(.000)	(.002)	(.000)	(.004)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.084	.092	.084	.094	.084	.096
	(.109)	(.044)	(.110)	(.040)	(.112)	(.034)
Campaign Contributions	-.089	-.084	-.087	-.082	-.072	-.069
	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.005)	(.000)
Presidential Election	.29	.28	.29	.28	.29	.28
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
MNC		-.040		-.041		-.039
		(.114)		(.103)		(.119)
Stock-listed		-.028		-.027		-.017
		(.379)		(.397)		(.586)
Real Exchange Rate		.25		.26		.26
		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)
Fixed Assets		-.013		-.013		-.0076
		(.465)		(.459)		(.669)
Constant	1.81	1.14	1.80	1.18	2.42	1.76
	(.000)	(.017)	(.000)	(.011)	(.000)	(.000)
Number Obs.	3,850	3,414	3,850	3,414	3,850	3,414
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Linear regression models with robust standard errors, clustered on NAICS industry, in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table G10 Success of AD Petitions: Upstream Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.51	.52				
	(.010)	(.004)				
η^T			.26	.25		
			(.001)	(.000)		
η^M					2.55	2.39
					(.000)	(.000)
Supplier Imports (log)	-.16		-.33		-.30	
	(.532)		(.245)		(.257)	
Upstreamness		.62		.70		.61
		(.063)		(.041)		(.082)
MNC	-.30	-.31	-.31	-.31	-.29	-.30
	(.056)	(.055)	(.058)	(.057)	(.073)	(.068)
Stock-listed	-.11	-.10	-.11	-.095	-.033	-.024
	(.596)	(.633)	(.620)	(.648)	(.873)	(.903)
Real Exchange Rate	2.04	1.96	2.08	2.04	1.95	1.93
	(.003)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)
Fixed Assets	-.032	-.012	-.028	-.011	.0053	.015
	(.788)	(.917)	(.819)	(.924)	(.965)	(.894)
Steel Products	-1.22	-1.33	-1.03	-1.28	-1.23	-1.46
	(.115)	(.072)	(.171)	(.065)	(.113)	(.045)
Industry Output (log)	.27	.23	.15	.16	-.22	-.17
	(.219)	(.257)	(.501)	(.442)	(.410)	(.472)
Percentage Change Imports	2.98	3.12	3.22	3.30	2.72	2.81
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.77	.82	.77	.85	.81	.88
	(.025)	(.020)	(.027)	(.017)	(.022)	(.014)
Campaign Contributions	-.49	-.51	-.49	-.50	-.38	-.40
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.003)	(.002)
Presidential Election	2.62	2.48	2.63	2.49	2.64	2.51
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Constant	5.65	1.56	10.1	1.74	14.2	6.19
	(.449)	(.622)	(.214)	(.574)	(.098)	(.079)
Number Obs.	3,370	3,325	3,370	3,325	3,370	3,325
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G11 Success of AD Petitions: Vertical Integration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.49	.49				
	(.007)	(.007)				
η^T			.23	.23		
			(.000)	(.000)		
η^M					2.32	2.28
					(.000)	(.000)
Vertical Integration	.28		.27		.31	
	(.001)		(.001)		(.000)	
Subsidiaries in Target Market		.22		.23		.21
		(.256)		(.247)		(.285)
MNC	-.34	-.31	-.35	-.31	-.34	-.30
	(.036)	(.042)	(.036)	(.039)	(.042)	(.049)
Stock-listed	-.20	-.15	-.19	-.14	-.13	-.072
	(.368)	(.500)	(.381)	(.514)	(.538)	(.727)
Real Exchange Rate	2.07	2.12	2.17	2.21	2.05	2.08
	(.003)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)
Fixed Assets	-.040	-.010	-.041	-.013	-.012	.019
	(.735)	(.931)	(.736)	(.917)	(.922)	(.872)
Steel Products	-1.40	-1.29	-1.37	-1.24	-1.54	-1.41
	(.056)	(.086)	(.050)	(.083)	(.034)	(.059)
Industry Output (log)	.30	.32	.23	.25	-.11	-.086
	(.137)	(.127)	(.238)	(.223)	(.637)	(.708)
Percentage Change Imports	2.97	2.91	3.14	3.07	2.70	2.63
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.80	.81	.82	.83	.85	.86
	(.022)	(.022)	(.020)	(.020)	(.016)	(.016)
Campaign Contributions	-.56	-.48	-.55	-.47	-.46	-.38
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.003)
Presidential Election	2.57	2.62	2.57	2.63	2.58	2.63
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Constant	1.90	1.40	2.13	1.68	6.47	5.94
	(.556)	(.662)	(.503)	(.595)	(.068)	(.094)
Number Obs.	3,370	3,322	3,370	3,322	3,370	3,322
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G12 Success of AD Petitions: Employment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.49	.42				
	(.009)	(.022)				
η^T			.24	.22		
			(.000)	(.002)		
η^M					2.44	2.01
					(.000)	(.001)
log Employees (firm)	-.046		-.052		-.045	
	(.094)		(.064)		(.108)	
log Employees (industry)		.10		.035		.062
		(.365)		(.754)		(.585)
MNC	-.25	-.33	-.26	-.33	-.28	-.32
	(.129)	(.036)	(.129)	(.039)	(.097)	(.042)
Stock-listed	-.026	-.20	-.0075	-.20	.075	-.13
	(.905)	(.350)	(.972)	(.358)	(.718)	(.513)
Real Exchange Rate	2.18	1.31	2.30	1.40	2.15	1.29
	(.002)	(.052)	(.001)	(.037)	(.001)	(.047)
Fixed Assets	-.11	-.074	-.12	-.079	-.098	-.041
	(.463)	(.583)	(.458)	(.562)	(.512)	(.759)
Steel Products	-1.00	-1.30	-.94	-1.20	-1.10	-1.37
	(.185)	(.106)	(.184)	(.117)	(.143)	(.085)
Industry Output (log)	.24	.22	.14	.17	-.23	-.12
	(.242)	(.339)	(.487)	(.434)	(.326)	(.622)
Percentage Change Imports	3.11	2.88	3.36	3.06	2.94	2.66
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.75	.79	.76	.80	.80	.84
	(.038)	(.030)	(.035)	(.029)	(.028)	(.022)
Campaign Contributions	-.35	-.52	-.34	-.52	-.23	-.43
	(.023)	(.000)	(.029)	(.000)	(.153)	(.001)
Presidential Election	2.44	2.34	2.47	2.35	2.47	2.37
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Constant	1.49	.23	1.83	.75	7.15	4.56
	(.638)	(.948)	(.559)	(.824)	(.040)	(.238)
Number Obs.	2,705	3,290	2,705	3,290	2,705	3,290
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G13 Success of AD Petitions: Industry-Level Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.56	.40				
	(.012)	(.049)				
η^T			.26	.20		
			(.001)	(.008)		
η^M					2.48	1.93
					(.000)	(.001)
GDP Growth added	5.32		5.52		4.66	
	(.002)		(.001)		(.007)	
Value Added (%GDP)		.30		.29		.28
		(.000)		(.000)		(.000)
Capital-Labor Ratio		3.36		3.23		3.10
		(.002)		(.002)		(.003)
MNC	-.33	-.35	-.34	-.36	-.32	-.35
	(.014)	(.020)	(.014)	(.017)	(.019)	(.020)
Stock-listed	-.21	-.039	-.20	-.035	-.12	.032
	(.433)	(.895)	(.469)	(.908)	(.633)	(.908)
Real Exchange Rate	2.19	2.07	2.30	2.15	2.07	2.02
	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)
Fixed Assets	-.057	-.56	-.059	-.54	-.025	-.50
	(.596)	(.004)	(.583)	(.004)	(.823)	(.007)
Steel Products	-1.43	-.99	-1.38	-.98	-1.55	-1.14
	(.065)	(.134)	(.058)	(.126)	(.056)	(.105)
Industry Output (log)	.25	.27	.18	.21	-.16	-.067
	(.377)	(.310)	(.502)	(.398)	(.611)	(.818)
Percentage Change Imports	2.87	2.68	3.01	2.84	2.54	2.48
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.82	.84	.85	.85	.87	.88
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Campaign Contributions	-.53	-.54	-.52	-.53	-.40	-.44
	(.000)	(.001)	(.003)	(.004)	(.012)	(.009)
Presidential Election	2.56	2.53	2.56	2.54	2.59	2.56
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Constant	1.92	3.01	2.09	3.17	7.15	6.97
	(.594)	(.446)	(.576)	(.435)	(.191)	(.186)
Number Obs.	3,327	3,244	3,327	3,244	3,327	3,244
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G14 Success of AD Petitions: Political Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.34	.49				
	(.082)	(.006)				
η^T			.18	.23		
			(.015)	(.000)		
η^M					1.76	2.30
					(.014)	(.000)
Counties > 250 employees	.21		.18		.17	
	(.053)		(.109)		(.131)	
Democratic Representation		-.24		-.23		-.00031
		(.804)		(.810)		(1.000)
MNC	-.37	-.31	-.36	-.31	-.35	-.30
	(.020)	(.054)	(.023)	(.053)	(.027)	(.062)
Stock-listed	-.083	-.12	-.085	-.11	-.032	-.040
	(.691)	(.564)	(.684)	(.581)	(.873)	(.840)
Real Exchange Rate	1.84	2.09	1.96	2.18	1.86	2.07
	(.007)	(.002)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)
Fixed Assets	.0073	-.034	.0021	-.034	.025	-.0067
	(.952)	(.775)	(.986)	(.775)	(.835)	(.955)
Steel Products	-1.38	-1.37	-1.35	-1.33	-1.48	-1.49
	(.065)	(.063)	(.060)	(.057)	(.048)	(.042)
Industry Output (log)	.036	.30	.021	.23	-.23	-.11
	(.878)	(.144)	(.929)	(.250)	(.319)	(.637)
Percentage Change Imports	2.90	2.93	3.05	3.10	2.72	2.68
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.81	.80	.82	.82	.85	.85
	(.020)	(.021)	(.020)	(.019)	(.017)	(.016)
Campaign Contributions	-.48	-.49	-.48	-.48	-.40	-.38
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.002)
Presidential Election	2.52	2.59	2.54	2.60	2.55	2.62
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)
Constant	4.26	1.74	4.05	1.97	7.27	6.34
	(.215)	(.597)	(.233)	(.543)	(.040)	(.080)
Number Obs.	3,370	3,370	3,370	3,370	3,370	3,370
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G15 Success of AD Petitions: Swing States

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.48	.49				
	(.008)	(.006)				
η^T			.23	.24		
			(.003)	(.002)		
η^M					2.27	2.31
					(.000)	(.000)
Industry employment in swing states (log)	.19		.12		.12	
	(.419)		(.703)		(.692)	
Firm in swing state		.007		.003		.043
		(.961)		(.971)		(.676)
MNC	-.31	-.32	-.32	-.33	-.31	-.32
	(.048)	(.042)	(.030)	(.012)	(.038)	(.016)
Stock-listed	-.12	-.099	-.11	-.093	-.045	-.028
	(.568)	(.640)	(.716)	(.764)	(.874)	(.921)
Real Exchange Rate	2.06	2.17	2.16	2.27	2.04	2.08
	(.002)	(.002)	(.004)	(.005)	(.003)	(.004)
Fixed Assets	-.023	-.12	-.027	-.12	.0017	-.087
	(.848)	(.344)	(.811)	(.354)	(.989)	(.497)
Steel Products	-1.36	-1.31	-1.32	-1.28	-1.49	-1.43
	(.066)	(.083)	(.077)	(.099)	(.069)	(.094)
Industry Output (log)	.28	.32	.22	.25	-.11	-.087
	(.177)	(.117)	(.421)	(.366)	(.724)	(.787)
Percentage Change Imports	2.92	3.12	3.10	3.31	2.67	2.83
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.80	.82	.82	.84	.85	.88
	(.022)	(.018)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Campaign Contributions	-.49	-.51	-.48	-.50	-.39	-.41
	(.000)	(.000)	(.004)	(.002)	(.016)	(.009)
Presidential Election	2.57	2.72	2.59	2.72	2.59	2.72
	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Constant	1.84	1.29	2.05	1.56	6.27	5.98
	(.569)	(.686)	(.555)	(.644)	(.171)	(.183)
Number Obs.	3,370	3,272	3,370	3,272	3,370	3,272
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G16 Success of AD Petitions: Campaign Contributions and Lobbying

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.50	.46				
	(.023)	(.035)				
η^T			.24	.22		
			(.004)	(.004)		
η^M					2.29	2.35
					(.000)	(.000)
Campaign Contributions	-.48		-.47		-.39	
	(.000)		(.001)		(.002)	
Lobbying	-.078		-.089		.039	
	(.754)		(.754)		(.888)	
Any Campaign Contributions		.061		.043		.11
		(.743)		(.832)		(.575)
Any Lobbying		.022		.015		.082
		(.930)		(.956)		(.769)
MNC	-.31	-.32	-.31	-.32	-.31	-.32
	(.026)	(.017)	(.023)	(.014)	(.027)	(.016)
Stock-listed	-.092	-.28	-.083	-.26	-.051	-.21
	(.704)	(.203)	(.736)	(.243)	(.833)	(.319)
Real Exchange Rate	2.10	1.96	2.20	2.07	2.07	1.98
	(.005)	(.007)	(.005)	(.007)	(.003)	(.003)
Fixed Assets	-.037	-.022	-.038	-.022	-.0062	.0065
	(.724)	(.845)	(.719)	(.838)	(.955)	(.955)
Steel Products	-1.37	-1.52	-1.33	-1.48	-1.49	-1.66
	(.082)	(.055)	(.075)	(.044)	(.068)	(.041)
Industry Output (log)	.29	.33	.22	.26	-.11	-.10
	(.308)	(.253)	(.401)	(.334)	(.738)	(.741)
Percentage Change Imports	2.95	2.96	3.12	3.14	2.69	2.74
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	.79	.83	.81	.85	.85	.88
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Presidential Election	2.62	2.58	2.63	2.59	2.62	2.60
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Constant	1.94	1.64	2.19	1.93	6.27	6.32
	(.572)	(.623)	(.539)	(.574)	(.177)	(.163)
Number Obs.	3,370	3,370	3,370	3,370	3,370	3,370
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G17 Success of AD Petitions: Export Market FE and Import Volumes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	.44	.54				
	(.015)	(.007)				
η^T			.21	.26		
			(.002)	(.000)		
η^M					2.12	2.79
					(.001)	(.000)
Import volume (log)	.16		.13		.092	
	(.116)		(.212)		(.374)	
MNC	-.31	-.30	-.31	-.31	-.30	-.31
	(.057)	(.074)	(.055)	(.072)	(.064)	(.077)
Stock-listed	-.13	-.083	-.12	-.078	-.054	.0027
	(.547)	(.711)	(.570)	(.727)	(.792)	(.990)
Real Exchange Rate	2.13	2.02	2.21	2.11	2.08	2.05
	(.001)	(.005)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
Fixed Assets	-.019	-.069	-.022	-.071	.00093	-.036
	(.870)	(.566)	(.851)	(.559)	(.994)	(.766)
Steel Products	-1.53	-1.87	-1.47	-1.85	-1.59	-2.13
	(.035)	(.019)	(.034)	(.016)	(.029)	(.006)
Industry Output (log)	.21	.32	.16	.25	-.12	-.17
	(.320)	(.136)	(.442)	(.224)	(.611)	(.495)
Percentage Change Imports	2.85	2.82	3.02	2.99	2.63	2.57
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)
Non-Market Economy	.82	2.03	.83	2.10	.86	2.14
	(.020)	(.101)	(.018)	(.082)	(.016)	(.095)
Campaign Contributions	-.49	-.53	-.48	-.52	-.39	-.42
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.002)	(.001)
Presidential Election	2.61	2.89	2.62	2.91	2.61	2.97
	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
Constant	-.75	1.75	-.055	1.98	4.47	7.11
	(.825)	(.649)	(.987)	(.603)	(.241)	(.105)
Number Obs.	3,370	3,202	3,370	3,202	3,370	3,202
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Export Market FE		✓		✓		✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G18 Success of AD Petitions: NME Split Samples

	(1) ME	(2) NME	(3) ME	(4) NME	(5) ME	(6) NME
η	.82	.12				
	(.000)	(.748)				
η^T			.35	.14		
			(.000)	(.256)		
η^M					3.38	1.35
					(.000)	(.196)
MNC	-.45	.049	-.44	.024	-.42	.045
	(.004)	(.894)	(.005)	(.949)	(.007)	(.904)
Stock-listed	-.15	.042	-.14	.034	-.077	.077
	(.433)	(.936)	(.449)	(.947)	(.675)	(.880)
Real Exchange Rate	4.07	.72	4.13	.87	3.80	.79
	(.000)	(.401)	(.000)	(.302)	(.000)	(.363)
Fixed Assets	.12	-.089	.11	-.11	.13	-.082
	(.549)	(.717)	(.564)	(.662)	(.483)	(.748)
Steel Products	-1.05	-1.54	-.89	-1.80	-.67	-1.99
	(.336)	(.228)	(.370)	(.131)	(.560)	(.099)
Industry Output (log)	.32	.11	.23	.055	-.36	-.11
	(.262)	(.714)	(.418)	(.842)	(.228)	(.732)
Percentage Change Imports	3.60	2.58	3.73	2.76	2.93	2.59
	(.000)	(.062)	(.000)	(.041)	(.000)	(.062)
Non-Market Economy	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Campaign Contributions	-.45	-.71	-.42	-.70	-.25	-.66
	(.001)	(.005)	(.003)	(.006)	(.088)	(.009)
Presidential Election	3.37	1.56	3.39	1.49	3.31	1.55
	(.000)	(.209)	(.000)	(.228)	(.000)	(.223)
Constant	-.17	-5.46	.11	-6.38	7.52	-3.54
	(.967)	(.521)	(.978)	(.454)	(.079)	(.682)
Number Obs.	2,107	1,134	2,107	1,134	2,107	1,134
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Logit models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.

Table G19 U.S. Congress: Briefs in Support of Petitioners

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
η	1.19	1.69				
	(.002)	(.003)				
η^T			.27	.38		
			(.004)	(.012)		
η^M					2.19	2.81
					(.001)	(.006)
Steel Products	-.39	-1.26	-.23	-1.06	-.56	-1.18
	(.193)	(.045)	(.467)	(.131)	(.090)	(.068)
Industry Output (log)	-.22	-.13	-.093	.060	-.28	-.21
	(.364)	(.597)	(.664)	(.818)	(.264)	(.528)
Percentage Change Imports	-2.31	-2.54	-2.38	-2.71	-2.53	-2.89
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Non-Market Economy	1.26	1.27	1.27	1.23	1.28	1.31
	(.002)	(.000)	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)	(.000)
Campaign Contributions	-.032	.0044	-.026	.0029	-.016	.012
	(.757)	(.964)	(.802)	(.976)	(.882)	(.895)
Presidential Election	-.15	.69	-.18	.69	-.20	.69
	(.791)	(.230)	(.747)	(.240)	(.719)	(.235)
MNC		.19		.21		.19
		(.214)		(.196)		(.229)
Stock-listed		-.16		-.19		-.16
		(.331)		(.296)		(.374)
Real Exchange Rate		1.09		1.20		.81
		(.156)		(.126)		(.332)
Fixed Assets		-.16		-.17		-.17
		(.135)		(.107)		(.109)
Constant	-341.6	-210.7	-367.9	-249.4	-349.5	-215.0
	(.002)	(.106)	(.001)	(.051)	(.001)	(.106)
Number Obs.	1,407	1,254	1,407	1,254	1,407	1,254
Time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAICS 3-digit FE		✓		✓		✓

Negative binomial models with robust standard errors, clustered by petition. p-values in parentheses.